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Abstract
We consider an occupation market in which preferences of members are treated as
non linear general increasing functions. The arrangement of members is separated into
two non over-lapping sets; set of workers and set of firms. We consider that firms have
vacant posts. Every worker needs a job and firms have opportunity to contract more
than one workers. A worker can work for just in at most one firm. We demonstrate the
existence of pairwise stability for such a business sector. Our model is the augmentation
of the Ali and Farooq [3] model by considering non linear valuations and bounded side
payments.
keyword: Stable matching, many-to-one matching, indivisible goods, increasing valuations
1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, a lot of research has been carried out in the two-sided matching
problem by a large number of scholars. In a two-sided matching problem, the set of members
is divided into two non over-lapping sets, where each member has a list of preferences which
has the members of another set. Basically the matching is a mapping from one set of
members to another set. More preciously the goal of two sided matching is to formulate the
partnership between the members of two sets. This matching must be stable as well.
A matching X is called stable matching if there is no blocking pair and all members
currently matched are mutually acceptable. The concept of two-sided stable matching was
introduced by Gale and Shapley [8] in their famous article “Marriage problem and College
admission”. Another fundamental article in this area is due to Shapley and Shubik [10],
that is known as assignment game. Gale and Shapley’s marriage model and Shapley and
Shubik’s assignment game have been broadly studied and a number of extensions of these
can be found in the literature. Many researchers studies the extension based one number of
partners in matching. More specially, these models that involve many-to-many and many-
to-one matchings. The other important direction of research is to look for the most general
valuation function that includes these two basic models, Gale and Shapley [8] and Shapley
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and Shubik [10] and well known generalization of these models like [6], Sotomayor [11] and [7],
as special cases. In this context, Farooq [7] and Ali and Farooq [4] are particularly important.
In Farooq [7], valuation function is considered as linear function of money where money in
[7] is taken to be continuous variable. Eriksson and Karlander [6] and Sotomayor [11] both
generalize the marriage model and assignment game. Both [6] and [11] are the special cases
of Farooq [7]. Whereas in Ali and Farooq [4], many-to-one matching is considered with
preferences of the players are represented as a linear function of money. Thus the models
[8],[10], [7] become the special cases of Ali and Farooq [4]. We can find many articles with
many-to-many and many-to-one matching. Many-to-one matching models due to Pycia [9]
and Echenique and Yenmez [5] consider two different matching models. For the models when
there complementarities and peer effects, Pycia [9] provides some important condition for
the stability. Many-to-one matching model [5] provides solution for the matching market
where the preferences are over the colleagues.
Here we highlight some related models that generalize valuation functions. The linear
valuation are presented in Farooq [7] and Ali and Farooq [4] with continuous variable, but
the valuation defined on discrete domain, is presented in Ali and Farooq [3]. The model [3]
addresses to the situations where the side payments are indivisible.
In Ali [1], the set of members is classified into two non over-lapping sets: a set of workers
and a set of firms. The set of workers is further classified into subsets, that represent
different categories in everyday life. Firms are bounded to hire more than one worker from
any category. A worker can work in only one category for at most one firm. This is a
novel idea that is different from simple many-to-one matching that we have considered in
our model.
Recently, Ali and Javaid [2] presented a model which involves general increasing functions.
This model [2] is generalization of [3]. In this work we have considered a generalization of
Ali and Javaid [2] model. In our model a job market is considered and the valuation of
members are treated as general increasing functions which may be nonlinear with discrete
side payments and the matching is many-to-one. The general nonlinear function for the
valuations are fij(z) and fji(−z) for each (i, j) ∈ E. A firm can hire more than one worker
and vacant positions are available for worker’s job. The number of workers that a firm can
hire is known as the quota of that firm. Workers can work for only at most one firm in this
model.
In Section 2 describes of our model briefly. Section 3 gives the chronological mechanisms
for worker and firm. Section 4 describes the outcome and pairwise stability for our model.
We devise an algorithm which finds a stable outcome in our model in Section 5. In Section
6, we discuss the main result of our model.
2 The Mathematical Model
We represent a model of matching market for job allocation of workers and firms. Let us
consider a matching market in which there are two non over-lapping sets of worker and firms.
2
The requirement of each firm is the workers and the requirement of each worker is a job in
a firm. A worker gives a financial benefit in form of revenue to the firm and firm pays a
reward (money) to its workers, called salary of the worker. Firms hire workers to fill up
their vacant positions.
Let us express our model mathematically, we take two sets F , a set of firms and W , a
set of workers. Here E = F ×W shows all possible pairs of firms and workers. Each firm
hires some workers from all available workers. The maximum number of workers that a firm
j requires is denoted by µ(j) and is known as the quota of a firm j. A firm can not hire
workers more than µ(j). Note that each worker can work for only at most one firm.
To increase or decrease the salary depends on the worker and firm consultancy. It is
assumed that the salaries are bounded in this model i.e ∀(i, j) ∈ E, aij and bij shows the
lower and upper bounds on salary, where a, b ∈ ZE2. Let p = (pij | (i, j) ∈ E) ∈ Z
E
shows the salary vector for all (i, j) ∈ E. It is feasible if a ≤ p ≤ b3. We consider
the preferences of players as the strictly general increasing functions, known as generalized
increasing valuations. The valuation stand for estimation of real property or some asset.
For all (i, j) ∈ E, define fij(z) and fji(−z) from Z into R, where z ∈ Z. fij(z) stands for
the valuation of the worker i, at a salary z from a firm j, when worker i joins firm j (that
is, matched with j). Similarly, fji(−z) stands for the valuation of the firm j when it hires
worker i and pays it salary z. It is important to note here that valuations play a significant
role in establishing the stability of matching.
3 The Firm-Worker Chronological Mechanism
Using valuations mentioned above, a comparison of the players of both sets can be made.
A worker i will prefer the firm j to the firm j∗ at salary z, z∗ ∈ Z, if fij(z) > fij∗(z
∗). If
fij(z) = fij∗(z
∗) than i ∈ W is indifferent between firms j and j∗ at salary z, z∗ ∈ Z .
Let us define the terms “indifferent” and“prefer” for a firm in the same sense. If a worker
is agreed for a job in a firm then it means the firm is acceptable to that worker. Similarly, if
a firm has willing to hire a worker then it means the worker is acceptable to that firm. By
fij(z) ≥ 0, represents that j is acceptable to i at salary z ∈ Z and fji(−z) ≥ 0 represents i
is acceptable to j at salary z.
4 Outcome and Pairwise Stability in Matching
In the two-sided stable matching theory, where firm and worker involves money plays an
important role. In this section, we describe the characteristic of an outcome for which it
would be stable.
2The notation Z stand for set of integers and notation R stand for set of real numbers. The notation ZE
stands for integer lattice whose points are indexed by E.
3For any x, y ∈ Z, we define [x, y]Z = {a ∈ Z | x ≤ a ≤ y}.
3
Let E is the set of all possible firm-worker pairs. A subset X of a set E is called matching
if every member appear atmost once in X . “A matching is called pairwise stable if it is not
blocked by any worker-firm pair and all members of matched pairs are mutually acceptable.”
We define S = (Sj | j ∈ F ), where Sj is given below,
Sj = {i ∈ W | i and j are matched}. (4.1)
If Sj = ∅ ∀j ∈ F , we means all positions are vacant in the firm j. If i ∈ Sj we means that a
firm j hires a worker i .
A set X = {(Sj , j) | j ∈ F} is known as job allocation if
(i) |Sj| ≤ µ(j) ∀j ∈ F .
(ii) Sj ∩ Sj∗ = ∅ ∀j, j
∗ ∈ F with j 6= j∗.
First condition may be considered as quota requirement for all firms and second condition
tells that no worker can work for more than one firm. This may be considered as quota
condition for workers. For any feasible salary pij, for all (i, j) ∈ E define q ∈ R
W as follows:
qi =
{
fij(pij) if i ∈ Sj for any j ∈ F
0 otherwise
(∀i ∈ W ). (4.2)
We have r = (rj |j ∈ F ) ∈ R
F , is defined as
rj =
{
min{fji(−pij) | i ∈ Sj} if |Sj| = µ(j)
0 otherwise
(∀i ∈ W ), (4.3)
where minimum over a null set is defined to be 0.
If X is a job allocation than (X ; p, q, r) is known as an outcome, p is feasible salary
vector, and q and r are given by (4.2) and (4.3), respectively.
For convenience, we write that Sj ∈ X (or j ∈ X), it always means that (Sj, j) ∈ X and
by (i, j) ∈ X , we always mean that i ∈ Sj.
An outcome will be blocked by a worker-firm pair in which firm and worker are not
matched to each other but both of these unmatched members prefer each other to their
current partners. Note here that there may be some members who are not matched to
any member from the opposite set, such a member is called self matched. In mathematical
language, the outcome (X ; p, q, r) has a blocking pair (i, j) ∈ E if ∃ θ ∈ Z with aij ≤ θ ≤ bij
such that i /∈ Sj and fij(θ) > qi, fji(−θ) > rj .
4.1 Pairwise Stability
Here for outcome (X ; p, q, r), the pairwise stability is defined as:
(ps1) fij(pij) ≥ 0 and fji(−pij) ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ X .
(ps2) fij(θ) ≤ qi or fji(−θ) ≤ rj , ∀ θ ∈ Z with aij ≤ θ ≤ bij and ∀(i, j) ∈ E.
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The (ps1) is showing the mutual acceptability of matched pairs, and (ps2) shows that the
outcome will not be blocked by any of the pairs.
5 Existence of a Stable Outcome in This Model
In this part, it will be shown that the pairwise stability always exist for the model given
in previous segment. We develop an algorithm to show the existence of pairwise stable
outcome. Initially, the highest feasible salary is set out in the algorithm in such a way that
firms are acceptable to workers at that salary. It is important to note that at this initial
value of the salary workers may not be acceptable to some firms. In other words, we can
say that at initially fixed salary firms and workers may not be mutually acceptable. Then
the mutually acceptable pairs of workers and firms are found. After this workers are to be
engaged to the firms that the workers prefer most. At this point firms accept proposals by
considering their quota and gain. Due to these constraints there may be some rejections.
These rejections induce the modification in salary vector. The salary is adjusted for a pair
if worker is rejected by the firm he or she prefers most. Salary is adjusted in every iteration
conserving the feasibility, till the pairwise stability is obtained. The algorithm will stop if
there are no rejections. Lastly, we will show that when the algorithm terminates, the output
is a stable matching.
Now ∀(i, j) ∈ E, pij ∈ Z is given as below:
pij =
{
bij if fji(−bij) ≥ 0 and
max
{
aij ,
⌊
−f−1ji (0)
⌋}
elsewhere.
(∀(i, j) ∈ E). (5.4)
Equation (5.4) guarantees that the salary vector p is a feasible. Also, note that p, defined
by (5.4), is the maximum integer in [a, b] for which fji(−pij) ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E.
Before presenting the algorithm in mathematical form, let us define some subsets of set E
which are useful to obtain a matching X that satisfies the condition (ps1). First, the subset
W0 and F0 of set E, containing those worker-firm pairs that are not mutually acceptable are
defined as:
W0 = {(i, j) ∈ E | fij(pij) < 0}. (5.5)
F0 = {(i, j) ∈ E | fji(−pij) < 0}. (5.6)
W0 is the set containing those pairs where worker is not willing to work in firm and F0 is the
set containing those pairs where firm is not willing to hire the worker at p given by (5.4).
Next, we define E˜ by
E˜ = E \ {W0 ∪ F0}, (5.7)
or
E˜ = {(i, j) ∈ E | fij(pij) ≥ 0 and fji(−pji) ≥ 0}. (5.8)
E˜ contains the set of mutually acceptable players.
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For each i ∈ W define q˜i as follows:
q˜i = max{fij(pij) | (i, j) ∈ E˜} (∀i ∈ W ). (5.9)
In equation (5.9) q˜i represents the valuation of most preferred firm for i ∈ W . Also, define
E˜W as follows:
E˜W = {(i, j) ∈ E˜ | fij(pij) = q˜i}. (5.10)
Equation (5.10) shows that E˜W contains those worker-firm pairs where firm is most
preferred for the worker. Since E˜W ⊆ E˜ this means that these pairs are acceptable. Initially
consider vector r = 0 and the subset ÊW of E˜W is given by:
ÊW = {(i, j) ∈ E˜W | fji(−pij) ≥ rj}. (5.11)
It can be noted that ÊW = E˜W where r = 0. But in the further iterations of algorithm ÊW
may become a proper subset of E˜W .
At the start of the algorithm, there is no matching X , so F˜ = ∅, where F˜ shows the set
of matched firms in X , and defined by
F˜ = {j ∈ F |j is matched in X}. (5.12)
Now, we find a job allocation X = {(Sj , j) | j ∈ F}, in the bipartite graph (W,F ; E˜W )
that satisfies the conditions given below:
X matches all members of F˜ , (5.13)
X minimizes ||Sj| − µ(j)|, among the matchings
that satisfy (5.13). (5.14)
X maximizes
∑
(i,j)∈X
fji(−pij) among the matchings
that satisfy (5.13) and (5.14). (5.15)
Initially F˜ = ∅, which follows that any matching satisfies (5.13). The outcome (X ; p, q, r)
up till these steps clearly satisfies the (ps1). For the satisfaction of (ps2), next we define a
set U having all mutually acceptable worker-firm pairs. Also firm is most preferred for the
worker but it reject the workers and consequently is unmatched in the matching X by:
U = {(i, j) ∈ E˜W | i /∈ Sj}. (5.16)
U has worker-firm pairs in which worker is not matched to his or her most preferred firm.
As the set E˜W has such mutually acceptable pairs and the firm is most preferred for the
worker out of all firms.
If U = ∅, then do not modify the salary vector p but if U 6= ∅, then salary vector will
be modified at each iteration of STEP[3] by satisfying (ps1). New salary vector p˜ must be
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feasible, that is aij ≤ p˜ij ≤ bij .
As here general non linear strictly increasing functions are considered to represent the
valuations, thus to modify salary vector p, a real number m∗ij ∈ R
++ can be found for each
(i, j) ∈ U , such that
fji(−(pij −m
∗
ij)) = rj . (5.17)
As we have considered discrete salaries, so we define an integer mij ∀(i, j) ∈ U as follows:
mij = max
{
1, ⌈m∗ij⌉
}
∀(i, j) ∈ U. (5.18)
The number mij ∀(i, j) ∈ U is an integer such that
fji(−(pij −mij)) ≥ rj, (5.19)
Note that ∀(i, j) ∈ U pij −mij is an integer and mij is the minimum positive integer, which
satisfies the inequality given by the equation (5.19).
Here the integer mij for all (i, j) ∈ U helps us to find the new salary vector such that
condition (ps2) is also satisfied. Now we define a subset L of U that has the pairs from the
U for which modified salary will not be feasible.
L = {(i, j) ∈ U | pij −mij < aij}. (5.20)
The modified salary vector p˜ must also be feasible and is given as:
p˜ij :=
{
max{aij , pij −mij} if (i, j) ∈ U
pij otherwise
(i, j) ∈ E. (5.21)
We also define a subset W˜0 of U by:
W˜0 := {(i, j) ∈ U | fij(p˜ij) < 0}. (5.22)
In the algorithm the modified salary vector will always decrease and the size of matching
X will increase. Also, the participants can change their preferences according to new salary
vector. Now, we suggest the algorithm.
Job Allocation Algorithm
STEP[0a]: First define p, W0, F0 E˜, q˜, E˜W using equation (5.4)-(5.7), (5.9), and (5.10),
respectively. Set X = ∅ which gives r = 0, q = 0 and F˜ = ∅ by (4.3), (4.2) and (5.12).
Also define ÊW by (5.11).
STEP[0b]: Form the bipartite graph (W,F, ÊW ) find a matching that satisfies (5.13) to
(5.15). Define U by (5.16) and update S and r by (4.1) and (4.3) respectively.
STEP[1]: If U 6= ∅ go to STEP[2], otherwise define q by (4.2) and stop.
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STEP[2]: To update p˜ compute mij for all (i, j) ∈ U by (5.18) and update p˜ by (5.21) and
set p = p˜.
STEP[3]: Define L by (5.20) and W˜0 by (5.22). Modify W0 : W0 ∪ W˜0, and F0 : F0 ∪L and
update E˜ by (5.8). Modify q˜, E˜W and ÊW by (5.9), (5.10) and (5.11), respectively.
STEP[4]: Form the bipartite graph (W,F, ÊW ) find a matching that satisfies (5.13) to
(5.15). Define U by (5.16) and update S and r by (4.1) and (4.3) respectively. Go to
STEP[1].
6 The Main Results
In this segment we will express that we developed a model by takeing the preferences of
members as non linear strictly increasing general function. Also this is many-to-one matching
model and money is taken as discrete variable. Is this section, we will prove some important
lemmas and theorems. We will put prefixes (old)⋆ and (new)⋆ before and after the updating
the integers/sets/vectors in any iteration of algorithm. The main result is the Lemma 6.1
that we prove here using the assumption given in equation (5.18). The proof of Lemma 6.2
is the direct consequence of Lemma 6.1.
Lemma 6.1. For each (i, j) ∈ U , fji(−p˜ij) ≥ rj holds at STEP[2] in each iteration of the
algorithm. Also for any (i, j) ∈ U , pij −mij is the maximum integer, whenever fji(−(pij −
mij)) > rj.
Proof. From equation (5.21) we have ∀(i, j) ∈ U
p˜ij = max {aij, pij −mij}.
Without loss of generality we assume that pij −mij > aij, that is, p˜ij = pij −mij . Then by
the definition of m∗ij given in (5.17), we have
p˜ij = pij −mij ≤ pij −m
∗
ij .
We can easily write it as −p˜ij = −(pij−mij) ≥ −(pij−m
∗
ij). Now by the nature of valuation
functions we obtain the following relation
fji(−p˜ij) = fji (−(pij −mij)) ≥ fji
(
−(pij −m
∗
ij)
)
= rj by (5.17).
Thus we have
fji(−p˜ij) ≥ rj .
This completes the proof of first part.
For the second part of the lemma, suppose that fji(−(pij − mij)) > rj , on contrary
suppose that pij − mij is not maximum for which the above inequality holds. This means
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that there exists another integer pij −m
′
ij such that
pij −mij < pij −m
′
ij , where m
′
ij ∈ Z
++, (6.23)
and
fji(−(pij −m
′
ij)) > rj . (6.24)
It follows equation (6.23) that mij > m
′
ij this means that
mij = max
{
1, ⌈m∗ij⌉
}
> m
′
ij .
Suppose mij = 1 then m
′
ij < 1, which is not possible asm
′
ij must be an integer. Now suppose
that
mij = ⌈m
∗
ij⌉ > m
′
ij .
By definition of ceiling function
mij ≥ m
∗
ij > m
′
ij ,
which implies that
−(pij −m
∗
ij) > −(pij −m
′
ij),
fji(−(pij −m
∗
ij)) > fji(−(pij −m
′
ij)).
Using equation (5.17), we have
fji(−(pij −m
′
ij)) < rj ,
which is contradiction to (6.24). Hence pij −mij is the maximum integer.
The base of our model is Lemma 6.1 that allows us to calculate a new salary vector by
preserving the of mutually acceptability and feasibility condition for the salary vector.
Lemma 6.2. :
At STEP[3] p˜ij is feasible and fji(−p˜ij) ≤ (old)rj for each (i, j) ∈ L.
Proof. To show the feasibility of p˜ij , ∀(i, j) ∈ L it would be enough to show that p˜ij = aij ,
∀(i, j) ∈ L. As L ⊆ U and for each (i, j) ∈ U , we have from (5.21)
p˜ij = max{aij , pij −mij}.
By equation (5.20) we know ∀(i, j) ∈ L,
pij −mij < aij,
So by equation (5.20) and (5.21), and fact that L ⊆ U , it is obvious that p˜ij = aij, ∀(i, j) ∈ L.
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By first part of the lemma we know that
pij −mij < aij = p˜ij,
−p˜ij < −(pij −mij),
fji(−p˜ij) < fji(−(pij −mij)).
We know by lemma 6.1, that fji(−(pij−mij)) ≥ rj. Result is trivial for fji(−(pij−mij)) = rj .
The inequality is true for a maximum integer pij − mij by lemma 6.1. As pij − mij < p˜ij
that is why fji(−p˜ij) ≤ (old)rj. Hence the result is proved.
The next lemma shows that we can find a matching in the bipartite graph (W,F ; ÊW )
which satisfies the equations (5.13) to (5.15).
Lemma 6.3. At STEP[4] of algorithm, we can always find a matching X satisfying the
equations (5.13) to (5.15)
Proof. If it is proved that (old)X ⊆ (old)EˆW in each iteration of the STEP[4]. It completes
the proof. We update the salary vector p and E˜ in each iteration at STEP[2] and STEP[3] by
equation (5.4) and (5.7). It is clear from these two equations that these modifications are only
element and subsets of U . Since U∩(old)X = ∅. Therefore it implies that (old)X ⊆ (old)EˆW .
Lemma 6.4. The properties:
(i) For each element of U \ {L ∪ W˜0} 6= ∅, salary p decreases at STEP[3], otherwise salary
vector remains the same.
(ii) For each element of L ∪ W˜0, at STEP[3], E˜ reduces otherwise remains same.
(iii) The vector r increases or remains the same.
Proof. (i) Initially the salary vector p is given by (5.4) and updated in each iteration by
(5.21). From (5.21), it follows that for each (i, j) ∈ U , p˜ij ≤ pij , the inequality may be true
for (i, j) ∈ L ∪ W˜0.
(ii) Initially E˜ is given by (5.7) and it is updated at STEP[3] in each iteration. At
STEP[3], F0 = F0 ∪L and W0 = W˜0 ∪W0, by equation (5.7) E˜ reduces if L 6= ∅ and W˜0 6= ∅
at STEP[3]. if L = ∅ and W˜0 = ∅, E˜ will not be changed by equation (5.7).
(iii) At the start Step[0], we set r = 0. Later on we modify r by (4.3). The matching X
satisfies condition (5.13) In each iteration, this means that F˜ ⊆ F˜ . Also (new)p ≤ (old)p
by part (ii) of Lemma 6.4. Thus (new)rj = fji(−(new)pij) ≥ (old)rj. For j ∈ (old)F˜ , as
matching X also satisfies (5.15). Moreover, (new)rj = (old)rj = 0 ∀j ∈ F \ (new)F˜ . Hence,
the vector r increases or remains same.
Theorem 6.5. If the algorithm terminates it produces a stable outcome.
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Proof. We know that X ⊆ E˜. Initially E˜ is defined by (5.7) and afterwards it is updated
at STEP[3] in each iteration. Thus fij(pij) and fji(−pij) are non-negative ∀(i, j) ∈ E˜.
Therefore, fij(pij) = 0 and fji(−pij) = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ X . This shows that the X satisfies (ps1)
at termination. On contrary to (ps2), assume that there exist a c ∈ [a, b] and (i, j) ∈ E such
that
fij(c) > qi and fji(−c) > rj.
If we take pij < c it yields fji(−pij) > fji(−c) > rj. But according to Lemma 6.1, pij
is the maximum integer for which this inequality holds. Thus pij < c is not true. Let us
consider that pij = c, which implies that
fij(pij) = fij(c) > qi. (6.25)
However, at termination we have U = ∅ means that (i, j) ∈ U and since (i, j) are not
matched, therefore, fij(pij) < q˜i = qi. A contradiction to (6.25). Thus (ps2) holds when the
algorithm terminates.
Theorem 6.6. The algorithm terminates after finite number of iterations.
Proof. Termination of the algorithm depends upon set of mutually acceptable pairs and
salary vector p. By the Lemma 6.4, part (ii), E˜, reduces either L 6= ∅, and W˜0, 6= ∅, or
remain unchanged. This case is true at most |E|, times.
If L = W˜0 = ∅, then, by part (i) of Lemma 6.4, pij decreases for each (i, j) ∈ U .
Otherwise, p remains unchanged. As we know that p is bounded and discrete, therefore, it
can be decreased a finite number of times. This proves that in either case our algorithm
terminates after a finite number of iterations.
This is the most important result which establishes the existence of pairwise stability for
our model.
7 Open Problem
• We generalized a one-to-one matching model of Ali and Farooq [3] in two directions.
Firstly, our model is many-to-one model, where as the model given by Ali and Farooq
[3] is one-to-one. Secondly the we the valuations of the players in our model are rep-
resented by strictly increasing general functions of money. Money is not a continuous
variable here. We can establish similar results by taking money as continuous variable,
it will include a large number of well known models as special cases. A many-to-many
version of our model would be an interesting problem.
• A slightly harder but worth while problem would to design a polynomial time algorithm
for these models .
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8 Concluding Remarks
We have represented a many-to-one matching market in which valuations are represented
by general non linear increasing functions. Each firm can hire the workers according to its
demand, but workers can not work for more than one firms. In this section we represent
some key functions and important remarks about the model presented in this chapter.
1. As proved in theorem (3.6.5), the algorithm always produces a stable many-to-one
matching, at termination. This guarantees the existence of stable outcome for our
model.
2. The algorithm presented here outputs a worker-optimal matching. This work is obvious
from the result discussed in Lemma 6.1, and the due increasing nature of valuation
function.
3. Marriage model by Gale and Shapley [8], and model presented by Ali and Farooq [3],
Ali and Javid model [2], are the special cases of this model.
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